INTRODUCTION
Psychologists as well as survey researchers in sociology, political science and related fields have long been aware that attitude m easurem ent is context dependent. Nevertheless, research on context effects developed fairly inde pendently in these scientific communities. W hereas psychological research on the emergence of context effects in attitude m easurem ent has traditionally 32 N O R B E R T SC H W A R Z A N D FR IT Z STRA CK been influenced by psychophysical models (see Eiser, 1990 , for a com prehen sive review), survey researchers docum ented a variety of question-order effects in attitude m easurem ent, usually with little reference to the underlying judgmental processes (see Hippier & Schwarz, 1987; Schuman & Presser, 1981; Schuman, in press , for reviews of that research tradition).
It has only been recently that cognitive (social) psychologists and survey methodologists have developed collaborative research programs, applying principles of inform ation processing to the question-answering process in survey interviews. This collaboration was initiated by two conferences, one organized by the US National Academy of Sciences during the fall of 1983 (cf. Jabine et a i. 1984) and the other by ZU M A . a Germ an social science m eth odology center, during the summer of 1984 (cf. Hippier, Schwarz & Sudman. 1987 ). In the m eantim e, collaborative research program s have been institu tionalized in different countries and a num ber of theoretical models of the cognitive and communicative processes underlying survey responses have been proposed (e.g. Feldman & Lynch, 1988; Feldman, in press; Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz et a i. in press; Strack. in press; Strack & M arlin. 1987; T o u r angeau. 1987. in press; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988) . On the applied side, this development promises to provide a theoretical framework for question naire construction that is likely to replace the largely intuitive " art of asking questions" in survey research. On the theoretical side, this collaborative en terprise poses a num ber of challenging issues for basic research in psychology (cf. Schwarz. Strack & Hippier, in press) .
One of these challenging issues concerns the conditions under which pre ceding questions may influence the responses given to subsequent ones. W hereas the potential impact of question order on the responses obtained in opinion surveys is well docum ented (see Payne. 1951; Schuman & Presser. 1981; Schwarz & Sudman. in press, for num erous research examples), the conditions under which context effects may em erge are not well understoodand when they em erge it has typically been difficult to predict their direction. In the present chapter, we shall draw on current theorizing in social cognition to identify variables that give rise to question context effects and to specify the conditions under which answering a preceding question results in assimila tion or contrast effects on subsequent judgm ents, that is. the conditions under which a subsequent judgm ent becomes similar to. or dissimilar from, a related previous judgm ent.
THE PROCESS OF QUESTION ANSWERING
From a cognitive perspective, answering an attitude question requires that respondents solve several tasks (see Feldman, in press; Strack, in press; Strack & Martin. 1987; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988 , for detailed discussions). As a CO N TE X T EFFECTS 33 first step, respondents have to interpret the question to understand what is meant. If the question is an opinion question, they may either retrieve a pre viously formed opinion from memory or ' compute" one on the spot. To do so, they need to retrieve relevant information from memory to form a judgm ent. Once a ''private " judgment is formed in their mind, respondents have to com municate it to the researcher-To do so. they may need to format their judgment to fit the response alternatives provided as part of the question. Moreover, respondents may wish to edit their response before they communicate it, due to influences of social desirability and situational adequacy. Accordingly, inter preting the question, generating an opinion, formatting the response, and edit ing the answer are the main psychological components of a process that starts with respondents' exposure to a survey question and ends with their overt report, as shown in Figure 2 .1, which is adapted from Strack and Martin (19S7) . (1987) 34
The nature of preceding questions may influence the question-answering process at each of these steps, but is most likely to exert an influence by affecting how respondents interpret subsequent questions, which information they retrieve from memory, and how they use this information in making a judgment. Accordingly, the impact of question order on question interpreta tion, inform ation retrieval, and information use will be of key interest in the present chapter.
QUESTION INTERPRETATION
Not surprisingly, the impact of preceding questions on the interpretation of subsequent ones is the more pronounced the more ambiguous the question is.
To begin with an extrem e case, consider research in which respondents are asked to report their opinion about a highly obscure-or even completely fictitious-issue, such as the " Agricultural Trade Act of 1978" (e.g. Bishop, Oldendick & Tuchfarber. 1986; Schuman & Presser. 1981) . As a psychologist, one may wonder why a researcher would ever want to ask such a question. The reason is that political scientists and other survey researchers are con cerned that the "fear of appearing uninform ed" may induce " many respond ents to conjure up opinions even when they had not given the particular issue any thought prior to the interview" (Erikson, Luttberg & Tedin, 1988, p. 44) . To explore how meaningful survey answers are, survey researchers intro duced questions on fictitious issues. Presumably, respondents' willingness to report an opinion on a fictitious issue casts some doubt on the reports p ro vided in survey interviews in general. In fact, about 30-50% of the respond ents do typically provide an answer to issues that are invented by the researcher. This has been interpreted as evidence for the operation of social pressure that induces respondents to give meaningless answers, which are presumably based on a " m ental flip of coin" (Converse, 1964 (Converse, , 1970 . R ather than providing a meaningful opinion, respondents are assumed to generate some random response, apparently confirming social scientists' wildest night mares (see Smith, 1984 , for a discussion of these " non-attitudes" ).
From a psychological point of view, however, these responses may be more meaningful than has typically been assumed in public opinion research. As noted above, respondents' first task is to determ ine the meaning of the ques tion. If the question is highly ambiguous, they may ask the interviewer for clarification. Chances are, however, that the well-trained interviewer re sponds, " W hatever it means to you", thus leaving respondents to their own devices. In this situation, respondents are likely to turn to the context of the ambiguous question to determ ine its meaning, much as they would be ex pected to do in any other conversation (Clark, 1985; Grice, 1975) . In fact, respondents have no reason to assume that the researcher violates each and every maxim that governs social discourse in everyday settings by asking a question that is neither inform ative and truthful nor relevant and clear. Ac cordingly, they may be likely to turn to the context of the conversation to determ ine the meaning of the am biguous utterance (cf. Schwarz & Strack, in press, for a m ore general discussion of conversational aspects of research procedures).
Once respondents have assigned a particular meaning to the issue, thus transform ing the fictitious issue into a better defined one that makes sense in the context of the interview, they have no difficulty in reporting a subjectively m eaningful opinion. Even if they have not given that particular issue a lot of thought, they may easily identify the broader set of issues to which this p ar ticular one apparently belongs. If so, they can use their general attitude to wards the broader set of issues to determ ine their attitude towards this particular one.
A study by Strack, Schwarz and W anke (in press ) illustrates this point. In this study, G erm an college students were asked about their altitude towards an " educational contribution" . For half of the sample, this target question was preceded by a question that asked them to estim ate the average tuition fees that students have to pay at US universities. The other half of the sample had to estim ate the amount of money that the Swedish government pays every student as financial support. As expected, students' attitude towards an "ed u cational contribution" was m ore favorable when the preceding question re ferred to money that students receive from the government than when it referred to tuition fees. Subsequently, respondents were asked what the ques tion actually referred to. C ontent analyses of respondents' definitions o f the fictitious issue clearly dem onstrated that respondents used the context of the " educational contribution" question to determ ine its meaning.
A s may be expected, the use of apparently related questions in interpreting am biguous ones is m ore pronounced the more respondents have the oppor tunity to screen the content of the questionnaire. Accordingly, it has been found to be m ore pronounced in self-administered questionnaires, where re spondents can go back and forth betw een questions and may spend as much tim e on them as they want, than in face-to-face or telephone interviews, where question presentation is strictly sequential and the time available to think about each question is severely limited (see Schwarz et a/., in press, for a discussion of the influence of m ode of data collection on respondents' cogni tive tasks). For example, in a study by Schwarz et at. (1990) , respondents were asked to report their attitudes towards a fictitious issue, namely the " In ter national T rade A ct of 1986" , either under self-adm inistered or under tele phone interview conditions. As expected, fewer respondents reported not having an opinion on the fictitious issue if the question was presented in a selfadm inistered questionnaire rather than in a telephone interview, indicating that respondents were more likely to m ake sense of the ambiguous question under self-administered conditions. In addition, their substantive responses to the International Trade Act question were closely related to their responses to several questions about import/export restrictions-asked five questions earlier-if the questions were presented in a self-adm inistered questionnaire (gamma = 0.69). but not if they were presented in a telephone interview (gamma = 0.11).
In summary, respondents may turn to the content of related questions to determ ine the m eaning of ambiguous ones. In doing so, they interpret the ambiguous question in a way that makes sense of it. and subsequently provide a subjectively meaningful response to their definition of the question. Accord ingly. it comes as no surprise that responses to fictitious issues do not conform to the model of m enial coin flipping as Converse and other early researchers hypothesized, but do show a meaningful and systematic pattern, as Schuman and Kallon (1985) observed.
THE IMPACT OF PRECEDING QUESTIONS ON THE INFORMATION USED TO ANSWER SUBSEQUENT ONES
However, preceding questions do not only influence the interpretation of subsequent ones in a straightforw ard way. R ather, they also determ ine which information comes to respondents' mind when m aking a subsequent judg ment, and influence how respondents use that information. We shall consider each of these aspects in turn.
Information Accessibility
As a large body of literature in cognitive psychology indicates (see Bodenhausen & W yer, 1987; Wyer & Srull, 1989 . for reviews), individuals are unlikely to retrieve ail inform ation that may potentially bear on a judgm ent but truncate the search process as soon as enough inform ation has come to mind to form a judgm ent with sufficient subjective certainty. Accordingly, their judgm ents strongly reflect the impact of the inform ation that is most accessible in memory at the time of judgm ent. This is usually the information that has been used most recently, for example for the purpose of answering a preceding question. Two studies on reported life satisfaction may illustrate this point. In one of these studies (Slrack. M arlin & Schwarz. 1988) , A m erican college students were asked to report their general life satisfaction as well as their dating frequency in a self-adm inistered questionnaire, and the two questions were asked in two different orders. When general life satisfaction was assessed prior to the frequency of dating, the correlation betw een both variables was 37 low and not significant, r = -0.12. R eversing the question order, however, dramatically increased the correlation to r = 0.66.
This reflects the well-known impact of increased cognitive accessibility: individuals do not retrieve all potentially relevant inform ation when they are asked to evaluate their life, but form a judgm ent on the basis of the subset of information that comes to mind most easily at that point in time (cf. Schwarz & Strack, 1991) . Accordingly, respondents were more likely to consider their dating behavior in making judgm ents of life satisfaction when this information was easily accessible, due to its use in answering the dating question, than when it was not.
Similarly, the correlation betw een ratings of "happiness with m arriage" and " happiness with life as a whale" depended on the order in which both ques tions were asked in a sample of G erm an adults (Schwarz, Strack & Mai, 1991 ) . If the general happiness question preceded the marital satisfaction question, both questions were m oderately correlated, r = 0.32. If the question order was reversed, this correlation increased to r = 0.67. However, the observed in crease in the correlation of m arital satisfaction and general life satisfaction was less pronounced, r = 0.46. and not significant, when several specific ques tions (work, leisure lime, and m arriage) preceded the general one. This find ing reflects that the larger num ber of preceding questions increased the accessibility of a more varied set of potentially relevant inform ation, thus reducing the impact of any specific piece of information.
In the framework of social cognition theorizing, these effects are not sur prising. However, the m ethodological im plications of cognitive accessibility processes have rarely been appreciated in substantive psychological and social research. As the above findings illustrate, we would draw very different con clusions about the impact of dating frequency or marital happiness on general life satisfaction depending upon the order in which the general and the specific questions were asked. A nd we would do so not only on the basis of the correlations but also on the basis of the means.
For example, respondents who reported high marital satisfaction also re ported higher life satisfaction when the specific question preceded the general one (M = 9.5, on an 11-point scale) than w hen it did not (M = 8.5). Conversely, respondents who were unhappy with their m arriage reported lower general life satisfaction when their attention was drawn to this aspect of their life (M = 5.8) than when it was not (M -6.8). Because the impact of the specific inform ation depends on its valence, how ever, these effects may cancel one another in a heterogeneous sample. In fact, mean differences as a function of question order could not be observed in this particular study in the sample as a whole (F < 1). This suggests that context effects may often not be detected because their conditional nature is rarely taken into account (see Smith, in press, for a m ore extended discussion of conditional order effects).
O n first glance, the finding that context effects may cancel out one another
in heterogeneous samples may suggest that context effects pose less of a problem to survey research than one might assume. This conclusion, however, is misleading. Although the mutual cancellation of context effects may result in a reasonably accurate estimate of the average opinion in the sample as a whole, it does underm ine comparisons of subgroups as well as the analysis of the relationship among different variables, which is at the heart of most scientific uses of survey data.
Assimilation or Contrast?
In the study described above, answering a marital satisfaction question re sulted in assimilation effects in the subsequent evaluation of one's life as a whole, that is, the answers to the general question reflected the valence of the life domain to which respondents' attention was drawn. This, however, is not always the case. U nder some conditions, answering a preceding question may result in contrast effects on responses to a subsequent question. A study by Strack, Schwarz and Gschneidinger (1985;  see also Schwarz & Strack, 1991) may serve as an illustration. In this study, some subjects were asked to write down three recent events that were either particularly positive and pleasant or particularly negative and unpleasant. Others, however, were asked to report positive or negative pas! events that had happened to them more than five years ago. This was done undeT the pretext of collecting life events for a life-event inventory, and the dependent variables, among them " happiness" and " satisfaction", were said to be assessed in order to " find the best response scales" for that instrum ent. As might be expected, subjects who had previously been induced to think about positive aspects of their present life described themselves as happier and m ore satisfied with their life as a whole than subjects who had been induced to think about negative aspects. If subjects had to report past events, however, the consequences were quite different. Thinking about hedonically relevant past events did not only fail to influence well-being judgm ents in the direction of their valence, but actually had a reverse impact. R espondents who thought about negative past events reported higher well-being than respondents who thought about positive past events.
Thus, highly accessible inform ation influenced the judgm ent in the dir ection of its hedonic quality, resulting in assimilation effects, if it pertained directly to subjects' present living conditions. If the easily accessible inform a tion pertained to subjects' previous living conditions, on the other hand, it apparently served as a salient standard of com parison, resulting in contrast effects. Accordingly, no main effect of hedonic valence, but only a crossover interaction of valence and tem poral distance, was obtained in this study.
In more general terms, these findings suggest that assimilation effects are likely to emerge if the previously activated inform ation is included in the tem porary representation that respondents form of the target category that is to be evaluated, in the present study the tem porary representation of their current living conditions. If the activated information pertains to a different category-in the present study to a different period of one's life-it is ex cluded from the tem porary representation of the target category. Note, however, that the recalled events may still bear on the dimension of judgm ent and may therefore serve as standards of comparison (e.g. K ahnem an & Miller, 1986) or as reference points for anchoring the response scale (e.g. Ostrom & Upshaw. 1968 ). E ither of these processes, com parison or scale anchoring, may result in contrast effects (see Schwarz & Bless, in press , for a more detailed discussion).
In line with this assumption, subsequent research (Strack, Schwarz & Nebel. 1987) dem onstrated that it is not tem poral distance by itself that moderaies the use of accessible information about o n e's life, but rath er the subjec tive perception of whether the event one thinks about pertains to one's current conditions of living or to a different episode of o n e's life. Specifically, we asked students to describe either a positive or a negative event that they expected to occur in " five years from now " . For half of the sam ple, we emphasized a m ajor role transition that would occur in the m eantim e, namely leaving university and entering the job m arket. Theoretically, this should increase the probability that respondents would assign the expected event to a 'different" phase of their life, and would therefore use it as a standard of comparison.
The results support this reasoning. W hen the role transition was not em phasized, subjects reported higher happiness and life satisfaction when they had to describe positive rather than negative expectations. W hen the role transition h w emphasized, this pattern was reversed, and subjects reported higher well-being after thinking about negative rather than positive future expectations. Again, these findings suggest that easily accessible inform ation elicits assimilation effects if it is assigned to the category of judgm ent, but results in contrast effects if it is excluded from that category.
This inclusion/exclusion assumption has recently been tested in a rather different content domain, namely the evaluation of politicians (Schwarz & Bless, 1990 , experim ent 1). One of the most highly regarded politicians in G erm any is currently Richard von W eizsäcker, who serves as President. He has been a m em ber of the Christian Dem ocratic party for several decades, but the office of President requires that he no longer actively participates in party politics. Officially, the President as the representative figurehead of the Federal R epublic of Germ any is considered to take a neutral stand on party issues. This rendered him particularly suitable for the present experim ent.
Specifically, we asked subjects a num ber of political knowledge questions. In one condition, they were asked to recall the party of which " R ichard von W eizsäcker has been a m em ber for more than 20 years". Answering " C D U " In another condition of the same study, however, subjects were asked which office Richard von W eizsäcker holds "that sets him aside from party politics". Answering this question should exclude Richard von W eizsäcker from the caiegory of CDU politicians. Accordingly, he may serve as a comparison point. If so, Ihis exclusion condition should result in lower evaluations of CDU politicians in general. This was again the case (M = 3.4).
In summary, these findings indicate that asking a preceding question in creases the cognitive accessibility of the inform ation that is used to answer it. This increases the likelihood that this inform ation will come to mind when respondents are later asked another question to which it may be relevant. How this easily accessible inform ation affects the judgm ent, however, d e pends on w hether it is included within the target category that is to be judged or not. If the inform ation is assigned to the target category, for example the Christian Democrats in the above example, it will be included in the database that is considered in m aking this judgm ent. This results in assimilation effects. If the information that comes to mind is assigned to a different category, but bears on the same underlying dimension, it will serve as a reference point. This results in contrast effects.
These inclusion/exclusion processes may result in some apparently para doxical findings. For example, in one study (Schwarz & Bless, 1990 , experi ment 2) respondents were asked two questions about a political scandal that received much attention in the Federal Republic of Germ any, namely the socalled Barschel scandal, that bears some resem blance to the W atergate scan dal in the United Slates. Subsequently, their trust in politicians was assessed in two different ways. Some respondents were asked to evaluate the trust worthiness of politicians in general. Nor surprisingly, these respondents re ported lower trust in politicians when they had previously answered questions on the Barschel affair than when they had nol. O ther respondents, however, were asked to evaluate the trustworthiness of three specific politicians whom pretests had shown to be not particularly trusted. In this case, a reversed pattern emerged. R espondents who had previously thought about the scandal now evaluated these specific politicians as more trustworthy. Thus, thinking about the same event reduced trust in politicians as a group but increased trust in individual group m em bers who were not considered particularly trust worthy to begin with. This, of course, is exactly what the inclusion/exclusion model of assimilation and contrast effects (Schwarz & Bless, in press) would predict. W hen re spondents are asked to evaluate politicians in general, the specific ones that come to mind as a function of the scandal questions are clearly relevant: they are members of the category "politicians", and are therefore included, result ing in assimilation effects. If respondents are asked to evaluate a specific politician, however, this is no( the case. R ather, in thinking about specific persons, each person makes up a category by him-or herself (Brewer, 1988) . Nevertheless, the politicians who were involved in the scandal, and their behavior, still come to mind. But given that they are not included in the category, they may now serve as reference points. And relative to them, even not so trustworthy candidates do not look that bad after all. Needless to say. political scientists' substantive conclusions about the impact of political scan dals on trust in politicians would be quite different depending on which ver sion of the trust questions was used.
Deriving Subsequent Judgments from Preceding Ones
Assume, however, that respondents were asked to answer both types of ques tions. For example, respondents might first be asked to evaluate the trust worthiness of politicians in general, and might then be asked la evaluate the trustworthiness of three specific ones. How might this question sequence affect the obtained results?
Research in social cognition suggests that individuals who have already formed a judgment are unlikely to start from scratch when asked to make a second, related judgment. Rather, they are likely to derive the second judgment from the implications of the first one, without reconsidering the original infor mation used in making the initial judgment. For example, Carlston (1980) asked subjects to form an impression of a student who allowed a fellow student to cheat in an exam by copying his answers. Some subjects were first asked to evaluate if the target person was "honest" , whereas others were asked if he was " kind". The answer is obviously "n o " to the honesty question, but "yes" to the kindness question. However, when subjects who had first evaluated the target's honesty were later asked to rate his kindness, they judged him to be less kind than subjects who evaluated his kindness initially. Conversely, those who had first evaluated his kindness rated him as m ore honest on the second occasion than did those who evaluated his honesty initially.
This pattern of findings suggests that subjects did not recall the behavioral inform ation they had used to form the first judgm ent when they were asked to m ake the second judgm ent. R ather, they apparently used the evaluative im plications of the first judgm ent to derive the second one, assuming that " good (or bad) trails go together". Thus, if he is kind, he must be honest, and vice versa.
N O R B E R T SC H W A R Z A N D F R IT Z STRACK
Applied to the above issue of politicians' trustworthiness, these findings sug gest that respondents who are first asked to rale the trustworthiness of politi cians in general may subsequently base their evaluation of specific politicians on the implications of their general judgment, concluding that the specific politi cians presented to them are probably not very trustworthy either. Empirically, this is the case. In the above study (Schwarz & Bless, 1990 , experiment 2), respondents who first thought about a political scandal and then evaluated the trustworthiness of politicians in general as being low subsequently gave low ratings of the trustworthiness of the specific politicians as well. Conversely, those who thought about the scandal and then evaluated the trustworthiness of three specific politicians as relatively high subsequently concluded that politi cians in general are relatively trustworthy as well. Thus, thinking about the scandal affected respondents' first judgment, and the implications of the first judgment were then used to derive the second one. Depending on which ques tion was asked first, one may therefore conclude that thinking about a political scandal decreases or increases trust in politicians in general, and decreases or increases trust in specific ones. Again, the substantive conclusions drawn are to a large extent a function of the structure of the questionnaire.
A Limiting Condition
It is im portant to note, however, that the emergence of contrast effects may require that the preceding question and the dependent variable tap the same underlying dimension. Simply drawing attention to an extrem e exemplar, without triggering thoughts about the exem plar along a specific evaluative dimension, may not be sufficient to generate contrast effects. For example, in a study by Schwarz, M ünkel and Hippier (1990) , conducted in a m arket research context, some respondents were asked to estim ate how frequently Germ ans drink vodka and others how frequently G erm ans drink beer. Subse quently, they had to rate how " typically G erm an" various drinks are.
Subjects who estim ated how frequently Germ ans drink vodka rated subse quent drinks as m ore typically G erm an than subjects who estim ated how frequently Germ ans drink beer. This replicated contrast effects that were obtained when the typicality of all stimuli, including the extrem e ones, had to be rated. O ther subjects, however, were asked as part of the preceding ques tions to estimate the calorific content, rather than the consum ption, of vodka or beer. While this question also serves to render these drinks highly salient in the interview context, it does not tap the typicality dim ension that underlies estim ates of the consum ption of these drinks. As a result, estimating their calorific content did not influence subsequent typicality ratings.
This finding, which awaits replication in other content domains, suggests that contrast effects may only em erge as a function of preceding questions if these questions lap the same underlying dimension of judgm ent. If they tap a C O N TE X T EFFECTS 43 different dimension, the information activated by the preceding question may not serve as a reference point and may therefore not affect respondents' judgments. Applied to the discussion of political trust, this would suggest that a question about Barschel's place of birth may not affect subsequent judg ments, even though it would also increase the accessibility of Uwe Barschel as a politician.
In contrast, carryover effects from a first to a second judgm ent, as observed in C arlston's (1980) study as well as the political trust study reported above, are unlikely to require that both judgm ents bear on the same dimension. R ather, carryover effects of this type seem to require that individuals hold a subjective theory that specifies the im plications of the first judgm ent for the second one (see W yer & Srull, 1989, for a m ore detailed discussion). In principle, these subjective theories may link rather diverse dimensions, result ing in a potentially rich set of heterogeneous carryover effects. Most likely, the nature of these theories, and certainly their cognitive accessibility at the lime of judgm ent, is itself context-dependent, further increasing the potential impact of the research instrum ent on the obtained results.
The Impact o f Conversational Norms
The above research examples dem onstrate that preceding questions influence what comes to mind, and indicate that the em ergence of assimilation and contrast effects depends on inclusion or exclusion of that inform ation from the database used to make the subsequent judgm ent. In these examples, the inclusion or exclusion of easily accessible inform ation was m anipulated by using recent or distant events (Strack, Schwarz & Gschneidinger, 1985) , by eliciting different categorizations of the prim ed information (Schwarz & Bless. 1990 , experim ent 1; Sirack, Schwarz & Nebel, 1987) , or by varying the dependent variable (Schwarz &. Bless, 1990 , experim ent 2). A nother variable that determ ines the inclusion or exclusion of easily accessible inform ation is the operation of conversational norm s that prohibit redundancy.
Specifically, one of the principles that govern the conduct of conversation in everyday life (Grice, 1975 ) requires speakers to m ake their contribution as inform ative as is necessary for the purpose of the conversation but not m ore inform ative than is required. In particular, speakers are not supposed to be redundant and lo provide inform ation that the respondent already has. In psycholinguistics, this principle is known as the " given-new contract", which emphasizes that speakers should provide " new" information rather than in form ation that has already been "given" (Clark, 1985; Haviland & Clark, 1974) . Strack and M artin (1987) pointed out, following related suggestions by Bradburn (1982) and Tourangeau (1984) , that this principle may be applied lo the emergence of question-order effects in survey interviews.
Specifically, these considerations suggest thal respondents may hesitate lo reiterate information that they have already provided in response to a preced ing question. For example, in one of the studies m entioned above (Schwarz, Strack & Mai, 1991) , respondents who have just reported their marital happi ness may consider the subsequent question about iheir happiness with life as a whole to be a request for new information. They may therefore interpret the general question to refer to other aspects of their life, much as if it were worded, "A side from your m arriage, how happy do you feel about the other aspects of your life?" If so, these respondents may deliberately exclude infor mation about their marriage in answering the general life satisfaction ques tion, despite its high accessibility in memory.
To provide a direct test of this assumption, the studies by Strack. Martin and Schwarz (1988) and Schwarz, Strack and Mai (1991) , reported above, included an explicit manipulation of the conversational context in which the specific and the general questions were presented. This was accomplished by a joint lead-in to both questions that read, for example:
Now. we would like to learn about l«.o areas of life that may be im portant for people's overall well-being: (a) happiness with marriage (b) happiness with life in general.
Subsequently, both happiness questions were asked in the specific-general order. As reported earlier, asking the marital satisfaction question first in creased the correlation between m arital satisfaction and general life satisfac tion from r = 0.32 to r = 0.67. This was not the case, however, when both questions were introduced by a joint lead-in, r = 0.18. This suggests that respondents deliberately ignored information that they had already provided in response to a specific question when making a sub sequent general judgm ent i f the specific and the general questions were assigned to the same conversational context, thus evoking the application of conversational norms that prohibit redundancy. In that case, respondents apparently interpreted the general question as if it referred to aspects of their life that they had not yet reported on. In line with this interpretation, a condition in which respondents were explicitly asked how satisfied they were with " other aspects" of their life " aside from their relationship" yielded a nearly identical correlation of r = 0.20.
In addition, respondents who were induced to disregard their marriage in evaluating their life as a whole, either by the conversational context manip ulation or by explicit instructions, reported higher life satisfaction when they w ere unhappily married and lower life satisfaction when they were happily m arried than respondents who were not induced to exclude this information. Thus, contrast effects were obtained when conversational norms elicited the exclusion of the primed inform ation, whereas assimilation effects were ob tained when the activated inform ation was included, as described previously.
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Finally, suppose thal several specific questions, for example questions about o n e's job satisfaction, leisure satisfaction, and marital satisfaction, are asked prior to the question aboui one's general life satisfaction. How would asking several specific questions affect the operation of the Gricean redun dancy norm ? In that case, it seems plausible that respondents may always interpret the general question as a request for a sum m ary judgm ent, irrespec tive of w hether the questions are placed in a joint conversational context or not. The available data are in line with this assumption. Specifically, introduc ing three specific questions along with the general question as pari of the same conversational context did not result in a decreased correlation of respond ents' relationship satisfaction and general life satisfaction, t = 0.48. as com pared to the same question order without a lead-in, r = 0.46. Moreover, explicit instructions to include all three life domains addressed in the specific questions when making Lhe general judgm ent resulted in a similar correlation of r -0.53, whereas the instruction to exclude these domains resulted in a correlation of r -0.11.
In summary, respondents may deliberately exclude information that they provided in response to a preceding question when answering a subsequent more general one if both questions are assigned lo the same conversational context, resulting in contrast effects. However, they are unlikely lo do so if several relevant questions preceded the general one. In the latter case, they interpret the general question as a request for a sum m ary statem ent, resulting in the inclusion of previously provided information and accordingly in assimi lation effects under all conditions. This contingency accounts for apparently inconsistent findings reported in survey literature thal provided the initial impetus for the present set of studies (Strack, M artin & Schwarz, 1988; Schwarz. Strack & Mai, 1991) . For example, Schuman and Presser (1981) obtained conlrasl effects of reporting o n e's marilal happiness on a m easure of general life satisfaction, whereas Smith (1982; see also Smith, in press) ob tained assimilation effects, allhough he apparently used the same questions in the same order. An inspection of the respective questionnaires reveals, however, thal the marital satisfaciion question was the only specific question used by Schum an and Presser, whereas il was p a n o f a larger sel of specific questions in Smith's study.
In addition lo illustrating lhe operation of inclusion and exclusion processes as a function of conversational norms, the present findings draw attention to the frequent neglect of conversational principles in social cognition research. According to social cognition theorizing (see Higgins & Bargh, 1987 , for a review), lhe use of information is solely determ ined by its cognitive accessi bility and its applicability to lhe judgm ent at hand. As the above study illus trates. however, easily accessible inform ation, that is clearly applicable to the judgm ent at hand, may not be used in making a judgm ent if its repeated use would violate the conversational norm of non-redundancy (see Strack, Martin , for a more detailed discussion). Thus, social cognition re search needs to pay attention to the social context in which a judgm ent is made, in addition to the determ inants of accessibility and applicability (cf. the contributions in Schwarz & Strack, in press ).
CONCLUSION
As this selective review of recent research on context effects in altitude m ea surem ent illustrates, the order in which related questions are asked, either in the psychological laboratory or in opinion surveys, may greatly influence the results obtained. In fact, these influences may be so pronounced that re searchers may draw opposite conclusions about the same substantive relation ship. depending on the order in which they ask the relevant questions. While much remains to be learned, the reviewed research suggests that the underly ing processes are systematic and predictable.
When individuals are asked an attitude question, they first need to under stand what is meant. If the question is ambiguous, they may consult the context of the question (e.g. Strack, Schwarz & W anke, in press) or its formal features (e.g. Schwarz el al., 1988 : Schwarz, 1990 ) to determ ine its meaning. A fter having made sense of the question, respondents may either recall a previously formed judgm ent from mem ory or com pute a judgm ent on the spot. To do so, they have to retrieve relevant information from memory. However, they are unlikely to recall all information that may bear on the judgm ent al hand but will truncate the search process as soon as enough inform ation has come to mind to solve the task (e.g. Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1987) . Accordingly, their judgm ent is based primarily on the inform ation that comes to mind most easily.
W hether this easily accessible inform ation results in assimilation or in con trast effects depends on w hether it is or is not included in the representation of the category lhal is to be judged (Schwarz & Bless, in press ). If it is included, an assimilation effeci is likely to emerge. If it is excluded, a contrast effect may em erge, provided that the inform ation bears on the dimension of judgm ent. The inclusion or exclusion of highly accessible inform ation is a function of its relationship to the object of judgm ent (e.g. Schwarz & Bless, 1990; Strack, Schwarz & G schneidinger, 1985) and of the operation of conver sational norm s (e.g. Schwarz, Strack & Mai, 1991; Strack, M artin & Schwarz, 1988) . The perceived relationship of the prim ed inform ation to the object of judgm ent may be influenced by the wording of preceding questions (as in the W eizsäcker study), by the nature of the dependent variable (as in the political trust experim ent), or by the tem poral distance of the event one thought about (as in the life satisfaction experim ent of Strack, Schwarz & Gschneidinger, 1985) , to name just a few variables that have been investigated to date.
W hether or not a sequence of questions evokes the operation of conversa tional norms of non-redundancy, on the other hand, depends on the similarity of the questions asked, their introduction (e.g. Schwarz, Strack & Mai, 1991; Strack, Martin & Schwarz, 1988) , or the spacing of the questions in the ques tionnaire (e.g. O ttati et al., 1989) . Most certainly, future research will uncover additional variables that are likely to influence the inclusion or exclusion of highly accessible inform ation from the database used to compute a judgment. Hopefully, this research will support the heuristic usefulness of the general framework offered here.
In concluding, we hope that the present chapter may illustrate that the recent collaboration of survey methodologists and cognitive (social) psycho logists on the processes that underlie survey responses promises to be an enterprise of mutual benefit. On the one hand, this collaboration offers in sights to survey researchers that are likely to reduce the risk of interpreting m ethod effects as substantial findings. On the other hand, it opens up a realm of challenging issues to psychologists which are likely to prove stimulating and fruitful for basic psychological theorizing. 
